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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ADOPTION OF WENDY JO
ROBERTSON AND NICHOLAS
I Ail ROBERTSON.

:
)
:
)

No. 14480

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit based on an Order to Show Cause

why the res-

pondent should not be adjudged to have abandoned and deserted her
minor children, Wendy Jo Robertson and Nicholas Ian Robertson,
why the respondent's rights as the natural mother should not be
extinguished, and why the Petition for Adoption of appellants
should not be granted.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This being a proceeding in equity, the matter was heard before the Court sitting without a jury.

The Court found that the

respondent had not abandoned her children and ordered the appellants1 Petition for Adoption dismissed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek to have this Court find as a matter of
law that the respondent abandoned her children, or

failing that,

to have the trial court's decision reversed and this case remanded for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Nicholas Robertson, and respondent, Judith Ann
Hutchison, were married June 30, 1965, in Springville, Utah.
30}

(R.

Two children were born as issue of that marriage, one girl,
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Wendy Jo Robertson, born February 3, 1966, and one boy, Nicholas
Ian Robertson, born April 11, 1968.

(R. 30)

In the fall of

1970, the respondent left Springville to go to Louisville for
the stated purpose of visiting her parents.

(T. 51, 15)

Kentucky, she refused to return to her home in Utah.

Once in

(T. 51)

The

appellant, Mr. Robertson, became concerned about his wife and the
welfare of his children, and went to Indiana to try to locate them.
(T. 51,54)

Upon locating them, he brought the children back to

their home in Utah.
pany them.

The respondent, however, declined to accom-

(T. 5, R. 30)

After returning home, Mr. Robertson made repeated efforts
to contact his wife and locate her whereabouts, but was unable
to do so.

(T. 54, 55)

Although her parents knew her place of

residence, and were in frequent contact with her, they refused to
give him any information that would enable him to establish contact with her.

(T. 54,23)

Since appellant lived with his child-

ren in the same house he had occupied with the respondent, she
could have contacted him or the children anytime she so desired.
(T. 16, 55)

She made no effort to do so.

(T. 15, 16)

Having made many futile attempts to contact her, and she
having made no attempt to contact him, appellant commenced an
action for divorce.

(T. 5 4)

Copies of the complaint and summons

were sent by registered mail to the respondent at her parents f
home.

She did not respond to the summons nor did she make an

|

appearance in court and a decree of divorce by default was obtained by the appellant awarding him custody of Wendy and Ian. (R.
Ex. 1)

(

Even at the time of the divorce proceeding, it was Mr.

Robertson's desire to reconcile with the respondent.
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(T. 57)

He

had no desire to deprive his wife of visitation rights, and, in
fact, provided for visitation rights in the divorce decree against
the advice of his attorney.

(I. 57)

A copy of the decree and all

other pertinent papers were sent to the respondent at her parents'
address.

(T. 57)

She did not respond nor make any contact with

Mr. Robertson or the children.

(T. 57, 58).

On August 15, 1971, Mr. Robertson married his present wife,
Patricia Robertson.

(T. 52)

Nicholas and Patricia Robertson

currently reside in Provo, Utah with Wendy and Ian and two other
minor children.

(T. 52)

Wendy is now 10 years of age.

Since the

age of 5, she has lived continuously with the appellant, Patricia
Robertson.
age 4.

She has not seen nor heard from the respondent since

(T. 20)

Ian is now 8 years of age and had lived contin-

uously with Patricia Robertson since age 3.
heard from the respondent since age 2.

He has not seen nor

(T. 20)

A strong bond

of love has developed between Patricia and Wendy and Ian, and
the children look to Patricia as their mother.

(T. 54)

Respon-

dent stipulated to the strong bonds of love and family ties that
have developed.

(T. 54)

On July 11, 19 75, the appellants petitioned for the adoption of Wendy Jo Robertson and Nicholas Ian Robertson by the appellant, Patricia M. Robertson.

(R. 71-74)

The Court issued an

Order to Show Cause why the respondent should not be adjudged to
have deserted and abandoned her minor children, Wendy Jo and
Nicholas Ian Robertson, and why the petition for adoption should
not be granted.

(R. 64,65)

In all of the time from September of 1970 to July of 1975,
a period of nearly five years, the respondent made no attempt to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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see or contact, directly or indirectly, either Wendy or Ian.
31)

(R.

She sent them no letters, cards, birthday or Christmas pres-

ents; she did not even attempt a telephone call.

(R. 31, T. 15,

39) It was not until July of 19 75, that the respondent made any
attempt to contact the children.

(T. 16)

On March 30, 1971, the respondent was involved in a motorcycle accident.

(T. 33)

Her medical records indicate that she

was hospitalized from that date until May 8, 1971, a period of
some five weeks.

(R. 30)

The record also shows that she sus-

tained several injuries, and these injuries caused her, from time
to time, to return to the hospital for further treatment.
Ex. 2)

(R.

She contends these injuries kept her from communicating

with the children.

(T. 36, R. 31)

Nevertheless, Mrs. Hutchison

admits that since the accident she has been able to maintain contact with her parents by phone and letters.

She has been able

to successfully work at several jobs, including waitress, sales
clerk, lay-out and paste-up artist for a publishing company,
personnel manager of a small store, and even managed some farm
property.

(T. 16, 17)

She also admits that she has not been

prevented from changing domiciles with great frequency.

Her

testimony shows that she lived in the towns of New Albany, Vivay
and Jeffersonville, in the State of Indiana, between the time of
the accident and her remarriage in November of 1972, a period of
some 18 months.

(T. 5, 6, 7)

Her medical bills also show bill-

ing statements sent to her in Lansing, Michigan and an additional
address in Jeffersonville, Indiana.

(R. Ex. 2)

Mrs. Hutchison also testified that she felt it was in the
best interests of the children to not to attempt to communicate
with them.

(T.
43)
Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
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At the trial the appellant attempted to introduce oral evidence to show that the respondent abandoned her children in September, 1970.

(T. 9)

The respondent objected to the introduc-

tion of all evidence of abandonment prior to. April 13, 1971, the
date of the divorce decree, on the grounds that such evidence
was immaterial to the issue before the Court.

(T. 9)

The ap-

pellant assured the Court that the evidence was indeed material,
and that the evidence would show the respondent's intent, motive,
proclivities and attitudes with respect to the issue of abandonment, in addition to showing respondent's abandonment preceded the
date of the divorce decree.

(T. 10)

On the basis of the respon-

dent's objection, the Court ruled that appellants would not be
allowed to go into events and circumstances that preceded the
divorce decree. CT. 9, 12)

The record clearly shows that the rul-

ing was based on immateriality.

(T. 9, R. 32)

In response to

the Court's adverse ruling, the appellant made several offers of
proof to further establish the materiality of the excluded evidence and preserve his record for appeal.

(T. 11, 12, 45-51)

POINT I
THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL CLEARLY PREPONDERATES AGAINST
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD NOT ABANDONED
HER MINOR CHILDREN.
A.

ADOPTION IS A PROCEEDING IN EQUITY.

V-An adoption proceeding is equitable in nature.
tion of D,

In Re Adop-

122 Utah 528, 252 P.2d 223 (1953); Walton v. Koffman,

110 Utah 1, 169 P.2d 97 (1946).

Thus, upon appeal, this Court

has authority to review the facts, and may determine the weight
of the evidence.

Utah Const. Art.VIII , §9; Crockett v. Nish,
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106 Utah 241, 14.7 P.2d 853 (1944); Nokes v. Continental Mining &
Milling Co., 6 Utah2d 177, 308 P.2d 954 (1954) ; Cannon v. Nauberger, 1 Utah2d 396, 268 P.2d 425 '(1954).

In Nokes v. Continental

Mining & Milling Co., supra, this Court took the opportunity to
carefully outline the standards and considerations that would
obtain in the review of equity decisions.

It is quite clear

from Nokes that in the review of an equity proceeding, the decision of a trial judge will be upheld unless the evidence clearly
preponderates against it.

The case law preceding Nokes and sub-

sequent to it clearly articulates the same standard.

It is

equally clear that if the evidence does clearly preponderate
against the trial court's decision, this Court has authority to
reverse such a decision and will do so.

Randall v. Tracy Collins

Trust Co. , 6 Utah2d 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956).
The reason for giving careful consideration to the trial
court's findings rests in the trial court's unique position to
observe the witnesses as they testify, for it is true that the
appearance, behavior and general demeanor of a witness is often
the key to the veracity of his testimony.

Nokes, supra.

Thus,

when the evidence is conflicting but preponderates in favor of
the findings, or even if the evidence is evenly balanced, the
finding below will not usually be overturned.

By the same logic,

it is clear that when the evidence is mostly testimony, and is
i

weighted slightly against the trial court's findings, the findings should not ordinarily be overturned.

Again, this is fay rea-

son of the the trial court's peculiar position enabling it to
analyze and evaluate the testimony as it is offered.

occasions, however, when the reviewing court is equally as wellDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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i

There are
.

placed as a trial court with respect to being able to determine
the weight and credibility of the evidence adduced in trial•

As

the Court points out in Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212
P.2d 194, (1949):
There are cases in which we may be in
equally as good a position as a trial court
to make inferences from what are called
basic, evidentiary and underlying facts.
For instance where the evidence is all documentary. . .; also where there are circumstances attending the evidence which mark it
definitely for one side or the other in respect to which circumstances the question of
credibility of witnesses would play no part;
or all the evidence is preserved in physical
form and there are no issues concerning it
in which the credibility of witnesses could
play a part. In the cases just mentioned and
in some others perhaps which might be thought •
of we would seemingly be in as good a position
as the trial court to make inferences and deductions from the evidence. (emphasis added)
The instant case is one in which the appellate court is in
as advantageous a position as was the trial court to judge the
evidence.

This is true for several reasons.

actually very little evidence in this case.

First, there is
The trial court's

ruling excluding all of the appellant's evidence relating to
events prior to the divorce decree left very little for the
appellant to present, other than the fact that the respondent
had not seen or contacted appellant or the children in nearly
five years.

The rest of appellantfs case consisted of offers

of proof made in response to the trial court's ruling.

These

proffers are not evidence per se to be weighed by this Court,
this Court only needs to determine whether these proffers were
material to the question of abandonment or desertion.
Second, the respondent has stipulated and admitted to several
-7-
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of the key facts which tend to show abandonment.

For example,

the respondent admitted that she had not seen or contacted the
children from September of 1970 to July of 1975.

(T. 15, 16)

Respondent also admits that she made no attempt to see or contact them.
Respondent further admits that she refused to accompany her children from Kentucky to their home in Springville, Utah, and that since
that time she has never even inquired of anybody as to their present
status or welfare.

(T. 19, R. 30)

Finally, respondent's testimony as to the reasons for not attempting to see or contact the children during the five-year period
are totally lacking in credibility, and are contradicted by her
own testimony and exhibits.

Respondent's admission to facts

damaging to her case and her self-contradictory testimony and
exhibits will be fully examined hereafter, and are mentioned
here only to establish this case as one in which the Court is
in equally as good a position as the trial court to pass upon
the evidence.
B.

THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL CLEARLY PREPONDERATES

AGAINST THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS.
The evidence in this case clearly preponderates against
the trial court's finding.

Indeed the only real evidence respondent

produced at t r i a l were bare asserstions that she was physically and
emotionally incapable of communicating with the children, and
I
some medical records which fail to support her claims.

In light

of respondent's admissions, stipulations and testimony regarding
her activity during the period in question, it would tax the
credulity of a saint to believe her supportive contentions,
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The record is clear that respondent made no efforts to see
or communicate with her children for a period of five years.
She admitted that she did not even make any inquiries about them,
and that the only information she ever had was what she just
happened to hear.

(T. 19). The respondent's explanation for

her apparent total disregard for her children is that on March
30, 19 71, she was involved in a motorcycle accident which caused
her physical and emotional injuries.

These injuries, she con-

tends, prevented her from communicating with her children as
she desired.
The appellant does not question the fact of respondent's
unfortunate accident which regretably caused her some serious
injuries, yet it is difficult to believe that the type of injuries
she suffered would prevent a mother who was genuinely interested
in the welfare of her children from attempting to see or contact
them for a period of five years.

In the instant case, in light

of the numerous and varied activities in which the respondent
engaged herself soon after the accident, and in which she engaged
up through July of 1975, it is disconcerting to be asked to believe
that the respondent was so physically and emotionally handicapped
that she could not communicate with her children nor concern
herself with their welfare had she any desire to do so.

Such

testimony is not a believable defense to the charge of abandonment.
The first weakness inherent in this defense is that it does
not explain why the respondent refused to accompany her children
back home in December of 1970, nor does it explain why the respondent
made no effort to see or contact the children from that time until
the time of the accident.

Respondent was apparently in good health

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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during that period of seven months.

It should be pointed out

that her daughter, Wendy, had a birthday in February of that
year and respondent did not bother to remember her on that day.
One is compelled to ask why she made no attempt to see or contact
her children during that period of time.

The Courtfs ruling

that evidence prior to the date of the divorce decree was immaterial
prevented the appellant from going into this period of time.
However, the respondent's own testimony shows that she declined
to return home with the children in September of 1970 and that
she made no attempt to contact her children during that period.
In spite of respondent's claim that physical injuries prevented her from communicating with her children, respondent was
able to hold various jobs v/hich required communicative and physical
abilities.

Respondent worked as a personnel manager of a small

business, as a graphic arts designer, and-as a lay-out and pasteup artist.

She also worked as a sales clerk, as a waitress, and

she even managed some farm property in Indiana.

It is incredible

to believe that she could perform these functions and duties
without being able to write memos, notes, letters, and speak
on the telephone,

yet she never sent a letter or a card to her

children, she never called them on the phone, never sent them
a birthday or Christmas card or gift.

She did send letters to

her parents and communicated with them all during this period.
(T. 39)
Respondent's claims that her physical disability prevented or made difficult any attempts to communicate with her children are further refuted by her rather transcient existence during
the period following the accident.

Respondent had many different

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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domiciles during this period, including residences in New Albany
and Jeffersonville, Indiana; Vavay, Indiana; Lansing, Michigan;
and others.

Her medical billing statements which she introduced

as respondent's Exhibit #2 also indicate that she resided at
many different addresses during this period.

These billing state-

ments and her own testimony show that she was indeed physically
well enough to set up housekeeping, move, and re-establish herself
many times during the period in question.

It is inconsistent

with everyday experience for a person to be capable of the types
of activities necessary to accomplish such physical tasks and
not be able to write a letter or make a phone call.
A final fact that refutes respondent's claim that her physical
and emotional condition made it difficult for her to communicate
with her children is the fact that by the fall of 1971, just
a few months after being discharged from the hospital, the respondent had become involved in a courtship which lasted about one
year and resulted in her marriage to her present husband.

Again,

it is difficult to contemplate conditions such that one is mentally
and physically strong enough to be involved in a courtship and
marriage and not be able to use ordinary methods of communication
to establish contact with one's children and to inquire as to
their well-being and needs.
In summary, all of the above facts considered together clearly
preponderate against the findings and decision of the trial court.
All of the above facts came from her own testimony and admissions.
It is clearly seen from these facts that she could have concerned
herself with the status and welfare of her children had she been
the least bit so inclined.

Her only rebuttal consists of medical

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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reports which show that she was hospitalized for eight weeks in
1971 and her own statements that she was physically hapmered and
mentally confused.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING, ON THE BASIS OF IMMATERIALITY,
EVIDENCE OF RESPONDENT'S ABANDONMENT PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE DECREE
OF DIVORCE, AND SUCH ERROR WAS PREJUDICIAL.
A.

THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE EVIDENCE AS IMMATERIAL.

In the instant case, the sole issue to be decided is whether
the respondent has abandoned her two minor children.

The facts

show that the respondent had not attempted to see or communicate
directly or indirectly with her children from September of 19 70 to
July of 19 75.

The issue of abandonment covers this entire period,

and any evidence relating to the time period, or which could help
to explain the events of this time period that would tend to prove
or disprove abandonment, would be material.
The question as to whether evidence is "material" or "immaterial"
depends upon whether the evidence relates to a matter in issue in
the case.

McCormick on Evidence, 2nd Ed., p. 434.

relates to something in issue, it is material.

If the evidence

Conversely,

"immateriality" denotes evidence which is offered to prove or disprove a fact or proposition which is not in issue.
Evidence, § 252.

29 Am.Jur.2d,

Thus, it is said that if evidence is "offered

to prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue or probative
of a matter in issue, the evidence is properly said to be immaterial".
McCormick on Evidence, 2nd Ed., p. 434.
In actual practice, the terms "materiality" and "relevancy"
are often used
interchangeably, and quite frequently, relevancy is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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said to include the requirement of materiality.

Materiality

and relevancy, taken together, form the most elementary rule of
evidence: matters offered in evidence must be relevant to the
issues and tend to establish or disprove them.
Evidence, § 2 52.

29 Am.Jur.2d,

Conversely, unless excluded by some specific

rule of exclusion (i.e. Hearsay Rule, Best Evidence Rule, etc.),
all evidence of facts and circumstances tending to prove or disprove any proposition which is in issue is properly admissible
and such evidence must not be excluded.

Foster v. Keating, 120

C.A.2d 435, 261 P.2d 529 (1953); Bole v. Bole, 76 C.A.2d 344, 172
P.2d 936, (1946); Berkshire v. Harem, 181 Or. 42, 178 P.2d 133,
(1947); Keeney v. City of Overland Park, 203 Kan. 389, 454 P.2d
456, (1969).
The Court's ruling, based as it is on immateriality, is clearly
erroneous.

The issue before the Court is abandonment.

All evidence

pertaining to that issue is material, whether relating to events
prior to the decree of divorce or subsequent to it.

This is es-

pecially true when as in this case, the time period covered by
respondent's apparent abandonment is one continuous period, including time both before and after the decree.

Thus, as long as

the evidence related to the issue of abandonment and has probative
value, i.e., tends to prove or disprove the matter in issue, it is
admissible unless the evidence must be excluded on some other
grounds.

Keeney v. City of Overland Park, supra.

The respondent

urges no other grounds, nor did the court speak to any other grounds,
as the basis of its ruling.

Thus, the appellant was deprived of

his right to put forth all of his relevant evidence material to
the issue of abandonment.

Foster v. Keating, supra; Bole v. Bole,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

supra,
B.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

The general rule is that when an exception is made to a ruling
excluding evidence, that exception must be based on an actual
offer of proof.

Rasmussen v. Davis, 1 Utah2d 96, 262 P.2d 488,

(1953); Dansak v. Deluke,

12 Utah2d 302, 366 P.2d 67, (1961).

See also 75 Am.Jur.2d, Trial, § 128.
At the time of the respondents objection, the appellant made
several offers of proof showing that the facts and events he
would prove, if allowed, were clearly material to the issue of
abandonment.

These proffers cover several pages of the transcript,

(see T. 11, 12, 46-50).
1.

The offers of proof included the following:

While appellant and respondent were married and living as

husband and wife in Ventura, California, the respondent became
attracted to a hippy-type element.
2.

Partially as a result of respondent's spending increasing

amounts of time with her hippy friends., both male and female,
appellant and respondent moved back to Springville, Utah.
3.

After returning to Springville, the respondent associated

herself with the hippy element there, was involved v/ith drugs and
other men.
4.

In the fall of 19 72, she went to Louisville, Kentucky to

visit her parents and to hopefully straighten herself out.

The

children accompanied her on this visit.
5.

At the end of the visit, instead of returning home, she

rented an apartment with some friends, without the knowledge of
her parents or her husband.

She used the money that her husband

had sent as airfare for her and the childrenfs return home.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6.

Respondent refused to tell appellant where she was living,

but with the help of the police, he located her and flew back to
see if he could persuade her to come home.
7.

When the appellant arrived at the apartment where the re-

spondent was living, it was quite late.

Very loud music was playing

inside.

The appellant found the respondent inside; she was scantily

attired.

There were many other people inside, male and female, who

were in various states of dress and undress and engaged in various
activities.
8.

He found his children in a back room, naked, lying on a mat-

tress, and covered in their own excrement.

The boys face was swol-

len with bug bites.
9.

Appellant had to do physical combat with respondent's male

friends to retrieve his children and leave the apartment.

The police

arrested respondent but released her to his custody if she would
return home with him.
10.

Her hippy friends accompanied her to the airport, she hugged

and kissed them good-bye, and was very openly affectionate with one
particular male companion.

She stated that she would do anything

necessary to keep from returning home with appellant and the
children.

She claimed that she would blow up the plane, kill him

and the children if she had to.

He let her stay behind.

From that

time in September of 1970 until July of 1975, shortly before this
petition was formally commenced, respondent never attempted to see
or contact in any manner her children.
11.

When Wendy Jo, who was then four, began to realize that

her mother probably was not going to ever come home, she became
very withdrawn and psychotic, and concluded in her own mind that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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that her mother had abandoned her.
The above events and circumstances, ha.d they not been excluded
by the Court's ruling, clearly indicate the respondent's intent to
desert and abandon her children.

Such evidence certainly is mat-

erial to the issue of abandonment and desertion.

Even though a strong

case for abandonment can be made solely on the basis of the facts
appearing since the decree of divorce, when the events and circumstances subsequent to the decree are examined in light of the
events prior to the decree, a vivid picture of abandonment is presented.

Exclusion of such evidence substantially denied the appel-

land his right to submit all relevant and material evidence showing
abandonment, and such error was manifestly prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
The overwhelming weight of the evidence at the trial clearly
demonstrated the respondent's abandonment of her children.

Had not

the trial court erred in prohibiting the appellants from going into events
and circumstances material to the issue of abandonment, but which
preceeded the date of the divorce decree, the respondent's abandonment would have been vividly clear.

The appellants, therefore,

respectfully urge this Court to reverse the trial court's decision
and find as a matter of law that the respondent abandoned her children,
or in the alternative, to reverse the trial court's decision and
remand for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this £/^

day of June, 1976.
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner-Appellants
to Cullen Y. Christensen, Attorney for Respondent, 55 East Center
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